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Abstract 
This paper presents a multi-channel search model, where each channel consists of multiple firms 
that are ex ante homogeneous to consumers. Consumers, nevertheless, ex ante can tell channels 
apart in the following aspects: search costs, product quality, product availability and price 
distributions. We first analyze the channel selection problem and show that a consumer’s optimal 
channel selection at any stage of the search is independent of found prices. We further show that 
the optimal channel choice can be determined using each channel’s reservation price and 
consumer valuation. We then apply this model to study the competition between legitimate and 
pirated products. One immediate result is reducing piracy services has no impact on consumers’ 
decision to pirate. When pirated products pose a threat, legitimate firms may respond by giving up 
low search cost consumers. This leads to the surprising result that piracy threat may induce firms 
to increase their product prices.   
Keywords:  Search, channel competition, information good, piracy, price dispersion 
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Introduction 
Imagine a consumer who wants to own the Blu-ray version of a movie. One option this consumer has is to search 
retailers in the legitimate online channel, such as BarnesNoble.com and Amazon.com, until she finds an acceptable 
price. Alternatively, she can visit services in the piracy channel, such as mininova.org and thepiratebay.org, where 
she may find a pirated version with acceptable quality for free. This second scenario is what many creators and 
distributors of information goods have been fighting against. However, despite years of costly efforts by trade 
groups such as the RIAA, piracy remains largely untamed: a joint research by the Business Software Alliance and 
IDC (2007) puts the piracy rate at 35% worldwide for 2004-2006.  
 A number of papers in economics and information systems have touched the piracy issue theoretically 
(Sundararajan 2004, Chellappa and Shivendu 2005, Park and Scotchmer 2005, Peitza and Waelbroeck 2006, 
Belleflamme and Picard 2007). Nevertheless, to date none has considered the possibility (often true in practice) that 
both the legitimate online channel and the piracy channel include many retailers/services, and thus competition can 
exist both inside and across channels at the same time. Our research fills in this theoretical gap by proposing a multi-
channel sequential search model. In our model, consumers face multiple channels (such as the legitimate and piracy 
channels), where each channel consists of multiple firms. To obtain information such as price and product 
availability, consumers incur a cost for each firm searched. All firms in the same channel are ex ante homogenous to 
consumers, thus consumer search within a channel is random. Consumers, nevertheless, ex ante can tell channels 
apart in the following aspects: search costs, product quality, product availability and price distributions. 
We carry out our analysis in two parts. In the first part, we consider a general multi-channel search model that is 
motivated yet broader than the aforementioned piracy story. Therefore, the results are also applicable to other 
business scenarios of channel competition, such as competition between online and offline channels. Our key 
research question in this part is the channel selection problem: given a search history, which channel a consumer 
will search next. A surprising and strong result we find is that a consumer’s optimal channel selection at any stage of 
the search is independent of found prices – in other words, history independent. We further show that the optimal 
channel choice is uniquely determined by every channel’s reservation price and consumer valuation: a consumer 
always first searches the channel that offers the largest difference between consumer valuation and the channel’s 
standalone reservation price.  
Because a consumer’s channel selection is history independent, interleaved searches across channels never takes 
place: a consumer always exhausts firms in her preferred channel before moving on to the second-preferred channel.  
In the second part of the analysis we focus on the legitimate and piracy channels case. The key research question is 
how the existence of piracy services affects pricing and demand of legitimate retailers. A striking result we find is 
that reducing the number of piracy services has no impact on consumers’ decision of whether to pirate unless all 
piracy services are shutdown. Intuitively, as long as at least one piracy service remains, our aforementioned analysis 
predicts that consumers will not alter their channel preferences. Therefore, those who prefer piracy still do so no 
matter how many piracy services are shutdown (unless of course all are shutdown). 
Compared to the case of no piracy, the existence of pirated products may increase the expected prices that legitimate 
retailers charge. This seemingly counter-intuitive result can be explained as follows. When piracy threat is strong 
enough, legitimate retailers will give up consumers with low search costs. As a result, high search cost consumers 
are left within the legitimate channel, which actually reduces in-channel competition among retailers. As a result, 
retailers are able to charge higher prices. Also interestingly, we find the existence of pirated products can lead to 
polarized pricing among legitimate retailers – more retailers end up charging a very high price.  
Our work is related to the literature on piracy and copyright enforcement (Gopal and Sanders 1998, Gopal and 
Sanders 2000, Chen and Png 2003, Hui and Png 2003, Chellappa and Shivendu 2005, Peitza and Waelbroeck 2006, 
Khouja and Park 2007, August and Tunca 2008). The economics and information systems research communities 
have approached piracy control (including whether it is necessary) from a number of perspectives. One school of 
research assumes that pirated goods have lower qualities than their legitimate counterparts, thus firms can use 
quality differentiation for piracy control (see, for example, Sundararajan 2004, Chellappa and Shivendu 2005, Park 
and Scotchmer 2005, Belleflamme and Picard 2007). A related second school of research argues that piracy control 
may not be necessary since the network effects created by piracy goods can increase the demand pool and thus 
benefit sales of legitimate goods (see, for example, Conner and Rumelt 1991, Takeyama 1994, Shy and Thisse 1999, 
Varian 2000, Bomsel and Geffroy 2005, Chellappa and Shivendu 2005). A recent paper by August and Tunca 
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(2008) considers network effects yet mainly focuses on the issue of software patching. As the network effect has 
been extensively studied in the piracy literature, we do not model it in order to focus on our sequential search 
approach.  
In comparison to all previous research on piracy and copyright enforcement, a unique feature of our work is that we 
consider many legitimate retailers and many piracy services, which is often the case in business practice. Such a 
model approach enables us to analyze legitimate retailers that face competitive pressures from two fronts 
simultaneous -- that from piracy services and that from peer retailers. 
Our work also adds to the information search and price dispersion literature (Diamond 1971, Reinganum 1979, 
Burdett and Judd 1983, Stahl 1989, Bhattacharjee et al. 2006, Baye et al. 2006), where the last reference provides a 
comprehensive survey of search models and empirical findings. A common feature of previous work on sequential 
search, except for Bhattacharjee et al. (2006), is that all firms are ex ante homogeneous to consumers; in other 
words, they consider only a single channel. Our work differs in that we consider multiple channels, consumers’ 
channel choices and inter-channel competition. To our knowledge Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) is the first to consider 
piracy using a model of consumer search. Our model differs from Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) in that we assume 
consumer valuations are ex ante known and thus the analysis focuses on price discovery; furthermore, Bhattacharjee 
et al. (2006) uses a combination of analytical and computational analysis while all our main results are derived 
analytically. 
In modeling price dispersion, we follow the approach pioneered by Stahl (1989), in which consumers are assumed to 
have two types: shoppers and non-shoppers. The former is assumed to have no search costs. We pick this approach 
not only because Stahl’s model is widely accepted in research on sequential search, but also because new 
information technologies, such as cell phone-based price comparison software, have dramatically reduced search 
costs for many consumers – examples of shoppers. Stahl (1989) considers a single channel while we discuss cross-
channel competition. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first lay out the general multi-channel search model. We 
then analyze optimal consumer search behavior. Following that we discuss piracy control and the impact of piracy 
on legitimate firm pricing. We conclude this paper in the last section. 
The Model 
There is a continuum of consumers with mass normalized to one, each of whom wants at most one unit of a product. 
A consumer’s valuation of a product is qv , where , (0 1),q q< ≤  represents the quality of the product offered by a 
firm, and v  represents the heterogeneity among consumer valuations. Following the sequential search literature, we 
assume that all consumers’ valuations are high enough so that they will search at least one firm (Diamond 1971, 
Stahl 1989, Baye et al. 2006). 
There are a number of firms that may differ in the following aspects: some carry the product while others 
do not; some offer a better quality than others; and some charge a higher price than others. Except for quality which 
is common knowledge, we assume that ex ante consumers know neither product availability at nor price offered by 
any firm. As a result, a consumer will have to search a firm if she wants to learn about availability and price at this 
firm.  
 Due to the above information asymmetry, ex ante consumers can only identify firms into two sets, which 
we refer to as channels a and b.
1
 All firms within channel i  ( ,i a b= ) are ex ante homogenous from a consumer’s 
perspective: they have the same quality 
i
q ; they have the same likelihood 
i
η  of carrying the product; and their 
prices follow the same ex ante price distribution ( )
i i
F p  on support [ , ]i ip p . 0i ip p> ≥ . If the density of ( )i iF p  
exists, denote it as ( )
i i
f p . Let A (B) represent the number of firms in channel a (b). Let 
i
c  denote the per-firm 
search cost in channel i , ,i a b= . For ease of exposition, we normalize the marginal product cost to zero.2 
                                                          
1
 This model and the analysis in the next section can be easily extended to any finite number of channels. 
2
 The model can be extended to include constant marginal costs; this will not qualitatively affect the results. 
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 The timing of the model is as follows: the availability and quality of the product a firm carries are 
exogenously given; firms first make pricing decisions; consumers then decide how to search. In the next section we 
analyze consumers’ channel selection problem under any given price distributions. We then narrow on to the 
legitimate/piracy channels case and analyze firm demand and pricing. 
Consumers’ Channel Selection Problem 
In this section we study consumers’ search behavior. We first solve a special case where one firm remains 
unsearched in each channel. We then generalize the results to any number of firms.  
One Firm Remains Unsearched in Each Channel 
In this subsection we characterize a consumer’s optimal search behavior given that she has searched all but one firm 
in each channel. For { , }i a b∈ , let the lowest found price be ˆ
i
p . Without loss of generality, we assume 
ˆ ˆ
a a b b
q v p q v p− ≥ − , so that channel a offers the best deal so far. One implication is that, if the consumer stops 
searching now, she will purchase from channel a if ˆ 0
a a
q v p− > , and not purchasing at all otherwise.  
If the consumer continues searching, there are two possible search paths. The consumer can search the 
remaining firm in channel a (a-firm for abbreviation) first, and afterwards may or may not search the remaining firm 
in channel b (b-firm for abbreviation) – this is denoted as the solid path in Figure 1. We call this path the a-priority 
path. The dashed path in Figure 1 represents the case where the consumer searches channel b first, and is called the 
b-priority path. We call a consumer’s choice between a- and b-priority paths the channel selection problem. 
 
Figure 1. Two Search Paths When One Firm Left in Each Channel 
 We shall note that, because channels a and b may differ in product availability and price distributions, a 
consumer faces different information sets at points α  and β  in Figure 1. Therefore, whether the consumer should 
continue searching after points α  or β  and what the expected payoff will be are state-dependent. As a result, to 
study the channel selection problem, for each path we need to consider the consumer’s total expected payoff from 
both steps of search. This differs significantly from previous research on single-channel search, where it is sufficient 
to study only the next immediate step of search to decide consumer behavior (Diamond 1971, Stahl 1989, Baye et al. 
2006). 
 As a preparation, we first define the concept of cross-channel reservation price. For , { , }i j a b∈ , cross-
channel reservation price j
i
r  is the lowest price found in channel i  such that searching in channel j  will yield zero 
expected payoff. In other words, j
i
r  satisfies 
 
( )




q q v r
j
j j j i i j j j j
p
q v p q v r f p dp cη
− +
− − − =∫ . (1) 
channel a 
channel b channel b 
 channel a 
ˆ
a a
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For notational convenience, denote 
ˆ





H p p x f x dx= −∫  for { , }i a b∈ , which represents the expected 
gain (before considering the search cost) of one more search in channel i  conditioning on that the lowest found 
price in this channel is p̂  and that the firm to be searched carries the product. It is straightforward to verify that 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
i i
H p F p′ = . Therefore, ˆ( )
i
H p  is a monotonically increasing and convex function. We can then rewrite 
equation (1) as 
 (( ) )j
j j j i i j
H q q v r cη − + = . (2) 
A special case is when i j= , under which jjr  solves 
 ( )j
j j j j
H r cη = . (3) 
j
j
r  is the classical reservation price frequently cited in papers on sequential search within a single channel (Baye et 
al. 2006). Given that ( )
j
H •  is monotonic, a comparison of (2) and (3) yields the following result: 
 




satisfy the following condition: 
 j j
i i j j
q v r q v r− = − . (4) 
  




r ; in other words, she stops searching when the payoff she can get from firms already searched in 
channel j is no less than 
j
j j
q v r−  (regardless of search costs already incurred since they are sunk). She can obtain 
the same payoff – and thus should also stop considering channel j – if she finds a price no more than j
i
r  in channel i. 
 For this subsection only, assume ˆ max{ , }a b
a a a
p r r>  so that searching either channel is a better choice for 
the consumer than stopping. We will later relax this assumption. Now we are ready to analyze the channel selection 
problem. Let 
ab





ˆ( ) ( ) [ (1 ( )) (1 )]
ˆ ˆ        +[ (1 ( )) (1 )] (( ) ( )) ( )










ab a a a a a a a a a a a b
p
q q v p
a a a a b b b a a b b b
p
p q q v p
a b b b a a b b b a
pr
u c p p f p dp F r c
F p q v p q v p f p dp






= − + − − − + −




∫ ∫ ) .a ap dp
 (5) 
The first item on the right side of equation (5) is the search cost in channel a. Note that the lowest price the 
consumer already found in this channel is ˆ
a
p , the second item thus represents the expected gain (i.e. price 
reduction) from searching one more firm in channel a (i.e. a-firm). After a-firm is searched, the consumer should 
continue searching b-firm if a-firm charges a price higher than b
a
r  or if a-firm does not carry this product at all – the 
according search cost is represented by the third item in equation (5). The final two items are the expected gain from 
searching b-firm: the former is when the price found at a-firm is higher than ˆ
a
p , and the latter is when the price 
found at a-firm is between ˆ
a
p  and b
a
r . 
The consumer’s expected payoff following the b-priority path, 
ba
u , is analogous with one caveat: since 
ˆ ˆ
a a b b
q v p q v p− ≥ − , the found best deal is in channel a, and thus ˆ
b
p  is irrelevant to her decision problem. We have 
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ˆ(( ) ( )) ( ) [ (1 ( )) (1 )]
ˆ ˆ        +[ (1 (( ) )) (1 )] ( ) ( )








q q v p
a
ba b b b b a a b b b b b b b a
p
p
b b b a a b a a a a a a
p
q q v p
b a a a b b a a
r
u c q v p q v p f p dp F r c
F q q v p p p f p dp






= − + − − − − − + −









q q v p








u  and 
ba
u  depend on the best found deal, ˆ
a a
q v p− , which in turn depends on ˆ
a
p . Therefore, when 
choosing between continuing or stopping search, a consumer’s optimal decision is history dependent. When 
choosing which channel to search first (conditional on searching is better than stopping), nevertheless, the next 
proposition shows a strikingly different result. 
 
Proposition 2: Given that only one firm remains unsearched in each channel,  
 
{ ( ) / ( ) /
                 + (( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) },
a b
ab ba a b b b a a a a b b
a a b b b b b a a a
u u F r c F r c
q v p q v p f p dp f p dp
η η η η
Ω
− = − +
− − −∫
 (7) 
where region Ω  is shown in Figure 2.  
  
(i). If a b
a a
r r≥  (or equivalently a b
b b
r r≥ ) (ii). If a b
a a
r r<  (or equivalently a b
b b
r r< ) 
Figure 2. Region Ω in Proposition 2 
 Proposition 2 is significant in that equation (7) does not contain ˆ
a
p  (or ˆ
b
p ). In other words, between a- 
and b-priority paths, which one is better does not depend on already found prices. This dramatically reduces the 
complexity of the consumer search problem and, as we will see shortly, enables us to characterize a consumer’s 
optimal decisions in the full search model. 
 Recall that we assumed ˆ ˆ
a a b b
q v p q v p− ≥ −  earlier to facilitate the analysis. It turns out Proposition 2 still 
holds if ˆ ˆ
a a b b
q v p q v p− ≤ −  – not surprising since neither ˆ
a
p  nor ˆ
b
p  appears in equation (7). 
 Equation (7) shows that the difference between a consumer’s expected gains from searching a- and b-
priority paths equals to an expression with many parameters – thus calculating this difference can be complicated. 
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Proposition 3: Suppose that a consumer has searched all but one firm in each channel. If ˆ a
a a
p r≤  and ˆ b
b b
p r≤ , the 
consumer stops search. Otherwise, 
(i) if a b
a a b b
q v r q v r− ≥ − , the consumer follows the a-priority path; 
(ii) if a b
a a b b
q v r q v r− < − , the consumer follows the b-priority path. 
The Full Search Problem  
In this subsection we analyze the full search problem, where a consumer faces A firms in channel a and B firms in 
channel b, and that the consumer has not searched any. Both A and B are integers larger than one. Recall that, 
following the sequential search literature (Baye et al. 2006), we assume consumer valuations are high enough so 
they will search at least one firm.
3
 






 potential paths. Among these paths, we now call the path that starts with consecutive searches of all firms 
in channel a the a-priority path, and the path that starts with consecutive searches of all firms in channel b the b-
priority path. See the figure below for an illustration where each channel contains two firms. 
 
Figure 3. Two Firms in Each Channel 
 In Figure 3, there are 6 paths: aabb, abab, abba, baab, baba and bbaa. Note that, along each path, a 
consumer’s search sequence may take the whole path, or most likely take only an earlier portion of this path if she 
stops. The top/right most path, aabb, is the a-priority path (denoted by the bold solid lines); the left/bottom most 
path, bbaa, is the b-priority path (denoted by the bold dashed lines). 
 
Proposition 4: Let , { , }i j a b∈  and i j≠ . For any given consumer, if 
 i j
i i j j
q v r q v r− ≥ − , (8) 
the consumer searches along the i-priority path. She stops and purchases upon finding a price no higher than i
i
r  at 
a channel i firm, or upon finding a price no higher than 
j
j
r  at a channel j firm. 
 
Even though the number of feasible paths grows exponentially in the number of firms, Proposition 4 shows 
that a consumer’s optimal choice is always one of two candidate paths: the a-priority path and the b-priority path. 
                                                          
3
 Nevertheless, the results in this section can be extended to show that, if a consumer’s valuation is low enough (i.e. 
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One direct implication is that, if a b
a a b b
q v r q v r− ≠ − , a consumer never conducts interleaved search: it is never 
possible for a consumer to switch from channel i to j, then switch back to channel i. 
We should note that this result of no interleaved search depends on the assumption that consumers know v  
and { , }
i j
q q  before searching. Previous research has suggested that, if consumers do not know v , and if 
i
q  and 
j
q  
are far apart, it is possible for a consumer to first sample a low quality firm for information gathering, and then 
switch to a high quality firm if v  turns out to be large (Chellappa and Shivendu 2005). 
The condition for a consumer’s channel decision, (8), is strikingly simple and has an intuitive explanation: 
i
i i
q v r−  ( j
j j
q v r− ) is a consumer’s payoff in channel i (j) if she finds a price that equals to the reservation price in 
this channel; and she should pick the channel that offers the best value at the respective reservation price. Note that, 
if the price distribution in a channel is atomless, the chance for a consumer to stop at a price quote that exactly 
equals to the reservation price is zero. Instead, she has probability one to stop at a price lower than the reservation 
price, and how low the found price is depends on the price distribution inside the channel. A strong implication of 
Proposition 4 is that, in expectation, the detailed shapes of price distributions under the reservation prices are not 
important for consumers’ decisions. 
Application to Competition between Legitimate and Piracy Channels 
In this section we narrow the scope of the multi-channel search model down to the case of legitimate and piracy 
channels, where the legitimate channel consists of multiple retailers and the piracy channel consists of multiple 
piracy services. We first introduce the model specifications used in this section. We then study that, given a price 
distribution among legitimate retailers, whether various piracy controls are effective at reducing piracy. Last we 
analyze the impact of piracy on the pricing decisions of legitimate retailers. 
The Case of Legitimate and Piracy Channels 
We use subscripts “l” and “ ρ ” to denote the legitimate and piracy channels, respectively. We still use A and B to 
represent the number of retailers and piracy services, respectively. Suppose that product availability is not an issue, 
i.e. 1
l ρη η= = . This is case, for instance, when the product is a popular item such as a popular movie. We 
normalize the quality of the legitimate product to 1. The pirated product’s quality is 1q qρ = < .  
As Diamond (1971) pointed out, a sequential search model where all consumers have positive search costs 
can result in all firms adopting monopoly pricing, which does not fit business practices where price dispersion is 
widely observed (Baye et al. 2006). Scholars have subsequently proposed various modifications to the Diamond 
model to address this discrepancy between theory and practice. Among them, one of the most influential works is 
Stahl (1989), which we follow in this section. 
 Following Stahl (1989), let there be two types of consumers. A proportion [0,1]µ ∈  of consumers – called 
shoppers – have zero search costs. This is the case, for instance, if a consumer has no opportunity cost of time, or 
enjoys window shopping, or possesses technologies (such as ShopSavvy on T-Mobile G1) that dramatically reduce 
search costs. The rest 1 µ−  consumers – called non-shoppers – have positive search costs lc  ( cρ ) in the legitimate 
(piracy) channel. Note that the analysis in the previous section applies to non-shoppers only. 
 Nowadays most popular piracy services use peer-to-peer technologies such as the BitTorrent protocol, 
where few have pricing/charging capability and thus pirated products are offered for free. Accordingly, let 0pρ ≡ . 
Let 
l
p p=  and let ( )F p  denote the price distribution in the legitimate channel. 
Piracy Controls when Price Distribution for Legitimate Retailers Fixed 
Legitimate retailers may compete with pirates in two broad ways. They can either keep their own prices constant 
while trying to make the piracy option less attractive to consumers, or they can adjust their prices to adapt to piracy 
services. We discuss the former in this subsection and the latter in the next one. 
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q v r r
ρ
ρ− + ≥ , or 
l
l l
r rρ ≥  (see Proposition 1). It is straightforward that (1 )
l
r q v c
ρ
ρ= − + . Hereafter we denote 
l
l
r r=  for notational convenience. Then, non-shoppers will choose the legitimate channel when (1 )r q v cρ≤ − + . 
Let 
min
p  denote the lowest price among all A retailers. Shoppers will buy from the retailer offering price 
min
p  when 
min
(1 )p q v≤ − . Since neither shoppers nor non-shoppers’ channel choices are dependent on B, we have:  
  
Proposition 5: Given ( )F p  and that there is at least one piracy service, reducing the number of piracy services 
does not affect consumers’ channel choices or retailers’ demands. 
 
Proposition 5 casts doubt on the effectiveness of chasing after and shutting down piracy services for 
reducing piracy. Unless all piracy services are shut down, Proposition 5 says a consumer will not change her piracy 
choice if retailers maintain a constant pricing strategy.
4
  
Proposition 5 is based on the assumption that 1ρη = , i.e. piracy services always carry the product. If 
1ρη <  instead, there is a chance of (1 )
B
ρη−  that none of the piracy services carry the product, and thus a consumer 
that prefers the piracy channel will eventually buy from a legitimate retailer. Nevertheless, when B is large – which 
is often the case in practice, (1 )
B
ρη−  decreases quickly to near zero and thus the return from shutting down a few 
piracy services is still very marginal. 
The Impact of Piracy on Retailer Pricing 
We first analyze the benchmark case where 0B = , i.e. there is no piracy threat and thus retailers are competing only 
with each others. Suppose the equilibrium reservation price is 
0




 If a retailer charges 
0







= . If it charges 
0
p r< , shoppers will purchase if p  is the lowest price among all A retailers, and thus its profit is 
11
( ) [ (1 ( )) ]
A





= + − . From 
0
( ) ( )r pπ π=  we have: 
 01
1
1 (1 ( )) / (1 )
A
p r








( ) ( )
1 (1 ) / (1 )
r
Ap
E p pdF p r dx
A x µ µ−
= =
+ − −∫ ∫ . 























r  increases in 
l
c  and A, and decreases in µ . We next analyze the case where 1B > . 
 
                                                          
4
 We will shortly show in the next subsection that retailer pricing does remain constant when the number of piracy 
services change. 
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Proposition 6: If 
0
(1 )r q v≤ − , 
0
r r=  and the piracy threat does not affect retailer demand and pricing. 
 
 Intuitively, when 
0
(1 )r q v≤ − , in-channel competition among retailers is already intensive, and as a result 
no retailer will price above (1 )q v−  – the quality premium the legitimate channel has over the piracy channel. As a 
result, neither shoppers nor non-shoppers will consider the pirated product, which in turn implies that retailer 
demands are not affected by piracy. As shown in equation (10), multiple factors may lead to intensive in-channel 
competition among retailers: a low search cost in the legitimate channel, or is small number of retailers, or a higher 
proportion of shoppers. 
 On the other hand, when 
0
(1 )r q v> − , the piracy threat will affect decisions by retailers as now consumers 
may find the pirated product attractive. Let 
1
11









= − − 






[1 ( ) ]
1 (1 ) / (1 )
r
lA








+ − −∫ . Since ( )rθ  is monotonically increasing, it is straightforward 
that *
0
r r> . 
 
Proposition 7: If 
0
(1 )r q v> −  and * (1 )r q v cρ≤ − + , 





1  if  
( ) 1 ( )  if (1 )
1
1 if (1 )
A
p r












= − − ≤ <

  − −




 Proposition 7 has a number of interesting implications. First, piracy threat increases the expected price 
charged by legitimate retailers (recall that *( )
l
E p r c= − ). This is surprising as one might expect cross-channel 
competition to put downward pressure on prices. To understand this result, consider the two types of competition a 
retailer faces: one from piracy services and the other from peer retailers. Without piracy services, the retailer will 
compete with in-channel peers for both non-shoppers and shoppers – the latter type of consumers lead to intensive 
price competition among retailers. With the piracy threat, however, a retailer that charges *p r=  gives up shoppers 
completely, and thus is competing with in-channel peers only for non-shoppers, on whom the retailer can charge a 
higher price. To summarize, cross-channel competition actually reduces in-channel competition among retailers, 
thus leading to a higher reservation price and a higher expected price. 
 Second, the piracy threat leads to polarized pricing among retailers. Note that *( )rθ  proportion of retailers 
charge the highest possible price – the reservation price. At the meantime, no retailer charges any price within 
*((1 ) , )q v r− . Intuitively, if a retailer charges a price within *((1 ) , )q v r− , only non-shoppers will purchase. But then 
this retailer can increase its price to *r  without losing any demand. 
 Piracy threats can drive up retailer prices, but only to a limited extent. Note that, if the reservation in the 
legitimate channel is higher than (1 )q v cρ− + , no consumer will purchase from this retailer. Therefore, (1 )q v cρ− +  
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Proposition 8: If 
*
(1 )r q v cρ> − + , (1 )r q v cρ= − +  and 
1
1
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(1 ) (1 )
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 = − +

= − − ≤ < − +

 − + − −





Moreover, non-shoppers select the legitimate channel with probability γ% .  
 
 Proposition 8 is analogous to Proposition 7 in that retailer prices are also polarized. Nevertheless, under 
Proposition 8 retailers are losing not only some shoppers, but also some non-shoppers since 1γ <% .  
 Proposition 7 and 8 together shows that, when the competition from the piracy channel is strong, retailers 
may give up low cost consumers, which in turn reduces the in-channel competition among retailers. As a result, 
piracy does not reduce the price retailers charge. This result is consistent with the fact that, despite years of piracy 
threats, major music labels have not significantly reduced CD prices. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper studies a multi-channel search model in which channels may differ in quality, product availability, search 
costs and price distributions. We show that a consumer’s channel choice at any stage of the search is uniquely 
decided by every channel’s reservation price and consumer value, and is independent of found price quotes or the 
number of firms left. 
 We then apply this model to analyzing the competition between legitimate products and pirated products. 
Our analysis yields a number of striking results. First, shutting down piracy services (except shutting down all) does 
not benefit legitimate retailers. Second, whether piracy affects pricing by legitimate retailers depends on the in-
channel competiveness among retailers. If in-channel competition is already intense enough, legitimate retailers will 
be charging low prices, and thus piracy services do not affect the demand of legitimate products. If in-channel 
competition is not intense enough, the threat of piracy may force some retailers to give up low search cost 
consumers, which actually reduces in-channel competition among retailers. As a result, legitimate retailers may 
increase prices in the face of piracy threats. 
 This research lays a foundation for future research on multi-channel search issues. One possibly is to apply 
the framework to other types of cross-channel competitions, such as competition between online and offline 
channels. Another possibly is to introduce valuation uncertainty into the model, so that a consumer’s search process 
is not only a price discovery process, but also a learning process with respect to product valuations. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Economics and Information Systems 
12 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix, Arizona 2009 
 We only prove the case where a b
a a
r r≥  (the case of a b
a a
r r<  is analogous). For notational convenience, we 
use [ ]
ab
u k  to denote the k’th component (sign included) on the right of size of equation (5). 
 [1] [3] ( )a
ab ba b b b a
u u F r cη− = − .  
[3] [1] ( )b
ab ba a a a b
u u F r cη− = . 
ˆ




ab ba a b b b a a a a a a a
p
u u F q q v p p p f p dpη η− = − + −∫ . 
ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ[4] [2] ( ) (( ) ( )) ( )
b a a
b
q q v p
ab ba a b a a b b a a b b b
p
u u F p q v p q v p f p dpη η
− +
− = − − − −∫ . 
ˆ
ˆ( )
[5] [5] ( )(( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
a a a
b b b a a
ab ba a a b b b b b a a a
p p p
p p q q v p
u u q v p q v p f p dp f p dp
Ω ≤ ≤
≤ ≤ − +
− = − − − −∫ ∫ . 
Then we can verify that ( [5] [5]) ( [2] [4]) ( [4] [2])
ab ba ab ba ab ba
u u u u u u− + − + −  
(( ) ( )) ( ) ( )a a b b b b b a a aq v p q v p f p dp f p dp
Ω
= − − −∫ .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
We only consider the case where a b
a a b b
q v r q v r− < − . 






b b a a b b b a a a a a
p p
F r c f p dp r p f p dpη− = − • −∫ ∫ . 






a a b b a a a b b b b b
p p
F r c f p dp r p f p dpη = • −∫ ∫ . 
 Therefore, equation (7) can be rewritten as  
( ) /
ab ba a b
u u η η−
1
( ) ( ) ( )
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(( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
a b
a a b b b b b a a aq v r q v r f p dp f p dp
Ω
+ − − −∫
3
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a a b b b a a ap r f p dp f p dp
Ω
+ −∫ , where areas 1Ω , 2Ω  and 3Ω  are shown the figure below. All three components 
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Proof of Proposition 7:  
Because 
0
(1 )r q v> − , (1 )r q v≤ −  is impossible: otherwise, from Proposition 6 we will have 
0
(1 )r r q v= > − . Hereafter we consider (1 )r q v> − . 
Suppose that (1 )r q v cρ≤ − +  (we will verify this later), thus non-shoppers first search the legitimate 
channel. It is straightforward that no retailer will pick any price between (1 )q v−  and r : otherwise, the retailer can 
increase its price to r  without losing any sales. A direct result of this observation is that there must exist a mass at 
(1 )p q v> − ; let this mass be θ . 







= . If it sets (1 )p q v= − , its profit is 
11
((1 ) ) (1 ) [ ]
A
















= − − 
. Note that 
θ  increases in r . 
If the retailer sets (1 )p q v< − , its profit is 1
1
( ) [ (1 ( )) ]
A





= + − . Thus we have 
1
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+ − −∫ . 
Also recall that ( )
l
E p r c= − . *r  is the unique reservation price that satisfies the last two equations simultaneously. 
From *( ) ( )p rπ π=  we can derive ( )F p  when (1 )p q v≤ − .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 8:  
First note that (1 )r q v cρ> − +  is impossible: otherwise, a retailer charging p r=  gets zero profit. 
(1 )r q v cρ< − +  is also impossible: otherwise, 
*r r=  which contradicts the assumption that * (1 )r q v cρ> − + . 
Therefore, it must be true that (1 )r q v cρ= − + . 
 At (1 )p r q v cρ= = − + , a non-shopper is indifferent between the two channels. Let γ  proportion 
of non-shoppers choose the legitimate channel when (1 )p q v cρ= − + . Then a retailer’s profit at (1 )p q v cρ= − +  is 
(1 )






− + = − + . If it sets (1 )p q v= − , its profit is 1
(1 )
((1 ) ) (1 ) [ ]
A





− = − + % , 









= • − 
% . 
Note that θ%  increases in γ . 
If the retailer sets (1 )p q v< − , its profit is 1
(1 )
( ) [ (1 ( )) ]
A





= + − . Thus we have 
1
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1 (1 ) / ((1 ) )
A
q v c
E p q v c dx
A x
θ ρ








Also recall that ( )
l
E p r c= − . γ%  is the unique value of γ  that satisfies the last two equations simultaneously. From 
( ) ((1 ) )p q v cρπ π= − +  we can derive ( )F p  when (1 )p q v≤ − .  Q.E.D. 
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